Liquidity saving mechanisms
We study the incentives of participants in a real-time gross settlement with and without the addition of a liquidity saving mechanism. Participants in our model face a liquidity shock and different cost of delaying payments. They trade-off the cost of delaying a payment with the cost of borrowing liquidity from the central bank. The heterogeneity of participants in our model gives rise to a rich set of strategic interactions. The main contribution of our paper is to show that the design of a liquidity saving mechanism has important implications for welfare. In particular, we find that adding one type of liquidity saving mechanism can either increase or decrease welfare depending on parameters.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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- Martin, Antoine & McAndrews, James, 2008.
Journal of Monetary Economics,
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