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Liquidity-saving mechanisms in collateral-based RTGS payment systems

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  • Marius Jurgilas
  • Antoine Martin

Abstract

This paper studies banks? incentives for choosing the timing of their payment submissions in a collateral-based real-time gross settlement payment system and the way in which these incentives change with the introduction of a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM). We show that an LSM allows banks to economize on collateral while also providing incentives to submit payments earlier. The reason is that, in our model, an LSM allows payments to be matched and offset, helping to settle payment cycles in which each bank must receive a payment that provides sufficient funds to allow the settlement of its own payment. In contrast to fee-based systems, for which Martin and McAndrews (2008a) show that introducing an LSM can lead to lower welfare, in our model welfare is always higher with an LSM in a collateral-based system.

Suggested Citation

  • Marius Jurgilas & Antoine Martin, 2010. "Liquidity-saving mechanisms in collateral-based RTGS payment systems," Staff Reports 438, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:438
    Note: For a published version of this report, see Marius Jurgilas and Antoine Martin, "Liquidity-Saving Mechanisms in Collateral-Based RTGS Payment Systems," Annals of Finance 9, no. 1 (2013): 29-60.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Angelini, Paolo, 2000. "Are Banks Risk Averse? Intraday Timing of Operations in the Interbank Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(1), pages 54-73, February.
    2. Angelini, Paolo, 1998. "An analysis of competitive externalities in gross settlement systems," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2000. "The CLS Bank: a solution to the risks of international payments settlement?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    4. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2001. "The CLS bank: a solution to the risks of international payments settlement?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 191-226, June.
    5. Bech, Morten L. & Garratt, Rod, 2003. "The intraday liquidity management game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 198-219, April.
    6. Galbiati, Marco & Soramaki, Kimmo, 2010. "Liquidity-saving mechanisms and bank behaviour," Bank of England working papers 400, Bank of England.
    7. Enghin Atalay & Antoine Martin & James J. McAndrews, 2008. "The welfare effects of a liquidity-saving mechanism," Staff Reports 331, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Peiris & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2015. "Collateral and the efficiency of monetary policy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 579-603, August.
    2. Thomas Nellen, 2015. "Collateralised liquidity, two-part tariff and settlement coordination," Working Papers 2015-13, Swiss National Bank.
    3. Jurgilas, Marius & Žikeš, Filip, 2014. "Implicit intraday interest rate in the UK unsecured overnight money market," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 232-254.
    4. Nellen, Thomas, 2019. "Intraday liquidity facilities, late settlement fee and coordination," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 124-131.
    5. Clara Machado & Carlos León & Miguel Sarmiento & Freddy Cepeda & Orlando Chipatecua & Jorge Cely, 2011. "Riesgo Sistémico Y Estabilidad Del Sistema De Pagos De Alto Valor En Colombia: Análisis Bajo Topología De Redes Y Simulación De Pagos," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República - ESPE, vol. 29(65), pages 106-175, June.
    6. Clara Machado & Carlos León & Miguel Sarmiento & Freddy Cepeda & Orlando Chipatecua & Jorge Cely, 2011. "Riesgo Sistémico Y Estabilidad Del Sistema De Pagos De Alto Valor En Colombia: Análisis Bajo Topología De Redes Y Simulación De Pagos," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República - ESPE, vol. 29(65), pages 106-175, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    liquidity-saving mechanism; intraday liquidity; payments;

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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