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The International Regulation of Dumping: Protection Made Too Easy


  • Klaus Stegemann


In many ways, the international regulation of dumping looks like a model of successful multilateral rule making. Yet the systemic justification of anti-dumping measures is dubious, and international rule making has perversely served to expand the scope for regulatory protection. The multilaterally agreed rules have made protection too easy, as compared to the standards that are used to regulate predatory behavior under domestic competition laws and as compared to the standards stipulated for safeguard measures under Article XIX of the GATT. This paper also explores the reasons why the deregulation of dumping will be difficult

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Stegemann, 1991. "The International Regulation of Dumping: Protection Made Too Easy," Working Papers 834, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:834

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    Cited by:

    1. Schuknecht, Ludger & Stephan, Joerg, 1994. "EC Trade Protection Law: Produmping or Antidumping?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(1-2), pages 143-156, July.
    2. Greetje Everaert, 2003. "Technology Adoption under Price Undertakings," LICOS Discussion Papers 13703, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.

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