Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition
Competition policy emerged as an important area of interest during the later stages of Uruguay Round negotiations. The task of establishing competition policy is complicated by the fact that there already are trade statutes---antidumping, countervailing duty, safeguard actions---that relate to issues of competition. Interestingly, the existing trade statutes often seemed designed to reduce the effect of foreign competition on domestic producers. The tension between the existing trade statutes and competition policy is most probably most clearly evidenced by antidumping law, the most widely used trade statute. In this paper I will concentrate on how one specific amendment, the cumulation provision, clearly makes AD an anti-competitive law and exemplifies the challenges that face those policy-makers who hope to move toward to an economically justified competition policy. Evidence will show that cumulation has led to more multiple petition filings and to smaller competitors being named. I will also argue that cumulation has changed the outcome (from negative to affirmative) in dozens, and possibly hundreds, of cases. Given all of these effects, cumulation should be viewed as a significant obstacle to those interested in assimilating AD law into the broader notion of competition policy.
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Volume (Year): 21 (1998)
Issue (Month): 8 (November)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1996.
"Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts Is Greater Than the Whole,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 746-769, October.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole," NBER Working Papers 5062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the Whole," Departmental Working Papers 199422, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
- Finger, J. Michael & Murray, Tracy, 1990. "Policing unfair imports : the U.S. example," Policy Research Working Paper Series 401, The World Bank. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)