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The International Regulation of Dumping: Protection Made Too Easy

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  • Klaus Stegemann

Abstract

In many ways, the international regulation of dumping looks like a model of successful multilateral rule making. Yet the systemic justification of anti-dumping measures is dubious, and international rule making has perversely served to expand the scope for regulatory protection. The multilaterally agreed rules have made protection too easy, as compared to the standards that are used to regulate predatory behavior under domestic competition laws and as compared to the standards stipulated for safeguard measures under Article XIX of the GATT. This paper also explores the reasons why the deregulation of dumping will be difficult
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Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Stegemann, 1991. "The International Regulation of Dumping: Protection Made Too Easy," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 375-405, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:worlde:v:14:y:1991:i:4:p:375-405
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Finger, J. Michael & Murray, Tracy, 1990. "Policing unfair imports : the U.S. example," Policy Research Working Paper Series 401, The World Bank.
    2. Jeffrey J. Schott, 2006. "Completing the Doha Round," Policy Briefs PB06-7, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    3. Dutz, Mark A., 1991. "Enforcement of Canadian"unfair"trade laws : the case for competition policies as an antidote for protection," Policy Research Working Paper Series 776, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schuknecht, Ludger & Stephan, Joerg, 1994. "EC Trade Protection Law: Produmping or Antidumping?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(1-2), pages 143-156, July.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6629 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Greetje Everaert, 2003. "Technology Adoption under Price Undertakings," LICOS Discussion Papers 13703, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.

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