Economic Arguments in U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy: Two Roads Diverged
In this paper, I compare economic arguments in U.S. Supreme Court antitrust and EU Court of Justice competition policy decisions on four topics: refusal to deal, predation, vertical contracts, and hor- izontal interfirm relations.
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- Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Competition vs. property rights: American antitrust law, the Freiburg School and the early years of European competition policy," MPRA Paper 33807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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