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Stackelberg equilibrium in duopoly: strategic use of corporate social responsibility

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  • Sharma, Ajay

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.

Suggested Citation

  • Sharma, Ajay, 2017. "Stackelberg equilibrium in duopoly: strategic use of corporate social responsibility," MPRA Paper 84326, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:84326
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Goering, Gregory E., 2008. "Welfare impacts of a non-profit firm in mixed commercial markets," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 326-334, December.
    2. Bian, Junsong & Li, Kevin W. & Guo, Xiaolei, 2016. "A strategic analysis of incorporating CSR into managerial incentive design," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 83-93.
    3. Michael Kopel & Marco Marini, 2014. "Strategic delegation in consumer cooperatives under mixed oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(3), pages 275-296, November.
    4. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd, 2006. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly: Corrigendum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1367-1367, September.
    5. Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 459-464, October.
    6. Pal, Rupayan & Sharma, Ajay, 2013. "Endogenizing governments' objectives in tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 570-578.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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