Cournot Oligopoly, Price Discrimination and Total Output
This paper extends the traditional analysis of the output effect under monopoly (third-degree) price discrimination to a multimarket Cournot oligopoly. Under symmetric Cournot oligopoly (all firms selling in all markets) similar results to those under monopoly are obtained: in order for price discrimination to increase total output the demand and inverse demand of the strong market (the high price market) should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demand and inverse demand of the weak market (the low price one). When competitive pressure (measured by the number of firms) varies across markets the effect of price discrimination on total output crucially depends on what market, the strong or the weak, is more competitive.
|Date of creation:||13 Jul 2017|
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- Takanori Adachi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2014.
"The Welfare Effects Of Third-Degree Price Discrimination In A Differentiated Oligopoly,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(3), pages 1231-1244, 07.
- Takanori Adachi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2011. "The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in a Differentiated Oligopoly," ISER Discussion Paper 0800, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Takanori Adachi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2011. "The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree PriceDiscrimination in a Differentiated Oligopoly," KIER Working Papers 800, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Aguirre Iñaki, 2016. "On the Economics of the “Meeting Competition Defense” Under the Robinson–Patman Act," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(3), pages 1213-1238, September.
- Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki, 2015. "On the economics of the "meeting competition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2015-86, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2016. "Multiproduct Pricing Made Simple," CEPR Discussion Papers 11692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2016. "Multiproduct Pricing Made Simple," MPRA Paper 68717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Iñaki Aguirre & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 2010. "Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1601-1615, September.
- Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki & Cowan, Simon & Vickers, John, 2009. "Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature," IKERLANAK 2009-39, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- Aguirre, Inaki, 2000. "The Most-Favoured-Customer Pricing Policy and Competitive Advantage," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 215-223, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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