Hard peg and monetary unions.Main lessons from the Argentine experience
Currency board (CB) was a corner solution for Argentine hyperinflation, however its balance is controversial. How does a CB work as a long run regime? After evaluating the result of ten years CB regime, we obtain important lessons for a monetary union and for dollarization proposals. We discuss: 1) the capacity of such a regime to deal with real and nominal volatility, 2) fiscal problems and debt dynamics, 3) financial problems under currency substitution, 4) CB regime compared with dollarization and 5) the feasibility of a single–peg CB in a flexible exchange rate world.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:||2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1999. "No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or At All Times," NBER Working Papers 7338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Mundell, 2000.
"Currency Areas, Exchange Rate Systems and International Monetary Reform,"
CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo.
167, Universidad del CEMA.
- Robert Mundell, 2000. "Currency Areas, Exchange Rate Systems and International Monetary Reform," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 217-256, November.
- Eduardo Borensztein & Andrew Berg, 2000.
"The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Target in Highly Dollarized Economies,"
IMF Working Papers
00/29, International Monetary Fund.
- Andrew Berg & Eduardo Borensztein, 2000. "The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Target in Highly Dollarized Economies," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 285-324, November.
- Enrique Alberola & Luis Molina, 2000. "Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes: a Case for Currency Boards?," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0006, Banco de Espa�a.
- Ricardo J. Caballero, 2000. "Macroeconomic Volatility in Latin America: A Conceptual Framework and Three Case Studies," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Fall 2000), pages 31-107, August.
- Andrés VELASCO, 2000. "Exchange-Rate Policies For Developing Countries: What Have We Learned? What Do We Still Not Know?," G-24 Discussion Papers 5, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7843. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.