Do monetary rewards undermine intrinsic motivations of volunteers? Some empirical evidence for Italian volunteers
Empirical studies show that intrinsic motivations increase the volunteer labour supply. This paper studies how monetary rewards to volunteers affect their intrinsic motivations. Using a sample of Italian volunteers, allowing to distinguish the type of volunteer, the paper shows that monetary rewards (extrinsic motivations) influence positively the choice to donate voluntary hours, while a low intrinsic motivation seems to decrease hours per week. Moreover, monetary rewards increase the hours per week of individuals with low intrinsic motivation. Thus, a crowding in effect on low intrinsic motivation might emerge for continuative volunteers.
|Date of creation:||2007|
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