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The economic analysis of a Q-learning model of Cooperation with punishment

Author

Listed:
  • Solferino, Nazaria
  • Solferino, Viviana
  • Taurino, Serena Fiona

Abstract

A Q-learning model is devised in order to see whether individuals can "learn" how to cooperate, when a virtuous system of punishment and reinforcement is adopted. The paper shows that, if it is possible to free-ride and not being adequately punished, there will always be an incentive to deviate from cooperation. Conversely, even if the others did not cooperate, it is still possible to have someone who cooperates when individuals are pushed by strong intrinsec motivations. Cooperation can be a learning process. It is possible to trigger a learning process that leads individuals to be equally cooperative. This happens much more easily, the more responsible the individuals are. It also depends on proper punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Solferino, Nazaria & Solferino, Viviana & Taurino, Serena Fiona, 2015. "The economic analysis of a Q-learning model of Cooperation with punishment," MPRA Paper 66605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:66605
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    2. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    3. Waltman, Ludo & Kaymak, Uzay, 2008. "Q-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 3275-3293, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperation; punishment; q-learning models.;

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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