Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Results from Greek Firms
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More about this item
KeywordsCorporate Governance; Firm Performance; Democratic and Dictatorship Firms;
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-01-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2008-01-05 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CSE-2008-01-05 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-RMG-2008-01-05 (Risk Management)
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