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Leviatán débil, un concepto para explicar el estado desde las regiones
[Weak Leviathan, a concept to explain the status regions]

Author

Listed:
  • Estrada, Fernando

Abstract

Our hypothesis is proposed to introduce the idea of ​​Leviathan weak, the classical conception of the state is problematized; primarily in regions suffering public violence, lack of legitimacy and sovereignty. This paper is the first part of a project that distinguishes three components that contrast with the type of state: (a) the relevance of geography to understand political and economic transformations arising at local level. (b) the parastatal structure (premodern) underlying the formation and maintenance of irregular armies in the Pacific region; (c) Strategic and assimilate correlations that distinguish groups fighting for the dominance of the state on regional geography. Here I limit my search to the first component. Further work should teach the correlations between paramilitaries groups of emerging Leviathan, their new identities and geopolitical impact within the overall set of geography to Colombia.

Suggested Citation

  • Estrada, Fernando, 2014. "Leviatán débil, un concepto para explicar el estado desde las regiones [Weak Leviathan, a concept to explain the status regions]," MPRA Paper 57156, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57156
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 793-807, December.
    2. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
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    JEL classification:

    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
    • R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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