Network Topology, Higher Orders of Stability and Efficiency
Stable networks of order r where r is a natural number refer to those networks that are immune to coalitional deviation of size r or less. In this paper, we introduce stability of a finite order and examine its relation with efficient networks under anonymous and component additive value functions and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule. In particular, we examine shapes of networks or network architectures that would resolve the conflict between stability and efficiency in the sense that if stable networks assume those shapes they would be efficient and if efficient networks assume those shapes, they would be stable with minimal further restrictions on value functions.
|Date of creation:||06 Jan 2014|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005.
"Strongly stable networks,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "Strongly Stable Networks," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2001-3, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 15 Nov 2002.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Anne van den Nouweland, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Microeconomics 0211006, EconWPA.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Working Papers 1147, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2004. "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 387-411, 05.
- ELLEFLAMME, Paul & BLOCH, Francis, "undated". "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1711, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2001. "Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks," Working Papers 443, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles, 2007. "Network potentials," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(1), pages 13-52, June.
- Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert P. Gilles, 2005. "Network Potentials," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse28_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Gilles, Robert P. & Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Sarangi, Sudipta & Badasyan, Narine, 2006. "Critical agents in networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 302-310, December.
- Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2006. "Unequal connections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 319-349, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:52749. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.