Коррупция, Демократия И Регуляторная Эффективность Государства
[Corruption, democracy and control effectiveness of the state]
The object of analysis is a state as a distributed system of decision making and the subject of analysis is its dysfunction as a result of action of institutional factors, in particular, corruption as an informal negative institute. The obtained results provide grounds for doubts in positive influence of democracy upon socio-economic processes, including upon the level of perceptible corruption. This suggests that democracy facilitates dispersion of responsibility and alienation of science from control, since scientific knowledge is not a “mass product” and becomes less and less demanded from the ruling elite in Ukraine. The function of the science as an institutional factor of effectiveness of state control lies in development of concepts of non-discretional mechanisms of decision making and also formulation of clear criteria for assessment of results of activity of subjects endowed with authority of decision making, in order to increase the level of their responsibility. Thus, we speak about such institutional factors of state control effectiveness as social responsibility and social control.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:||2013|
|Publication status:||Published in Problems of Economy / Проблемы экономики 2 (2013): pp. 102-107|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
- Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World; Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Working Papers 98/63, International Monetary Fund.
- Johann Lambsdorff, 2003. "How corruption affects persistent capital flows," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 229-243, November.
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