Assignment of Heterogeneous Agents in Trees under the Permission Value
We investigate assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees where the allocation rule is given by the permission value. We focus on efficient hierarchies,namely those, for which the payoff of the top agent is maximized. For additive games, such hierarchies are always cogent, namely, more productive agents occupy higher positions. The result can be extended to non-additive games with appropriate restrictions on the value function. Finally, we consider auctions where agents bid for positions in a two agent vertical hierarchy. Under simultaneous bidding, an equilibrium does not exist while sequential bidding always results in a non-cogent hierarchy.
|Date of creation:||27 Jul 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gilles, R.P. & Owen, G. & van den Brink, J.R., 1991.
"Games with permission structures : The conjunctive approach,"
FEW 473, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Gilles, Robert P & Owen, Guillermo & van den Brink, Rene, 1992. "Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 277-93.
- Gilles, R.P. & Owen, G. & van den Brink, J.R., 1991. "Games with permission structures : The conjunctive approach," Discussion Paper 1991-14, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Oliver E. Williamson, 1967. "Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 123.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:49115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.