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Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value

Author

Listed:
  • Subhadip Chakrabarti

    (QUB - Queen's University [Belfast])

  • Amandine Ghintran

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Rajnish Kumar

    (Queen's Management School - QUB - Queen's University [Belfast])

Abstract

We investigate assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees where the payoff is given by the permission value. We focus on optimal hierarchies, namely those, for which the payoff of the top agent is maximized. For additive games, such hierarchies are always cogent, namely, more productive agents occupy higher positions. The result can be extended to non-additive games with appropriate restrictions on the value function. Next, we consider auctions where agents bid for positions in a vertical hierarchy of depth 2 . Under standard auctions, usually this results in a non-cogent hierarchy.

Suggested Citation

  • Subhadip Chakrabarti & Amandine Ghintran & Rajnish Kumar, 2019. "Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value," Post-Print hal-02501134, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02501134
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-019-00226-y
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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