The Emergence of Efficient Institutions and Social Interactions
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsInstitutional Emergence; Coordination Games; Stochastically Stable Equilibrium; Network Formation; Social Distance;
- B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2013-05-19 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-NET-2013-05-19 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-05-19 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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