Implementation of Walrasian Allocations in Economies with Infinite Dimension Commodity Spaces
This paper considers the problem of implementing constrained Walrasian allocations for exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many agents. The mechanism we provide is a feasible and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with constrained Walrasian allocations. This mechanism allows not only preferences and initial endowments but also coalition patterns to be privately observed, and it works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and thus it is a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.
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