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EU and US security policy from the cold war era to the 21st century: the institutional evolution of cfsp and the factors that determine the American military supremacy

Listed author(s):
  • Economou, Emmanouel/Marios/Lazaros
  • Metaxas, Theodore

This article aims to clarify the main parameters that define security policy in Europe and the United States. A historical review on the principal economic, political and military agreements in these two dipoles of power is presented from the dawn of Cold War to nowadays. We also examine the institutional integration of European defense strategy from the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to nowadays, and the crucial effects of the 11/9/2001 terroristic attack on US security policy implementation. A comparative analysis between EU and US defense capabilities is displayed mainly through the issue of their defense outlays from which we try to explain US military and geopolitical supremacy in comparison to the defense weaknesses of their European allies. The study also raises questions about the possible dangers the USA might face through their attempts to maintain their global hegemony even further than 2025/30. We conclude that the European security policy, which was strongly motivated via economic integration during Cold War era, is highly characterized by structural inefficiencies and the unwillingness of European US allies to spend more about their defense by acting as NATO free-riders, which entails the reduction of its effectiveness comparing to US defense strategy.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 41003.

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Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision: 2011
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:41003
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  1. Jomana Amara, 2007. "Evaluating Nato Long Run Defense Burdens Using Unit Root Tests," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 157-181.
  2. Dunne, J. Paul, 1995. "The defense industrial base," Handbook of Defense Economics,in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 399-430 Elsevier.
  3. Jomana Amara, 2008. "Nato Defense Expenditures: Common Goals Or Diverging Interests? A Structural Analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(6), pages 449-469.
  4. Hubert Van Tuyll & Jurgen Brauer, 2003. "Colonizing military history: A millennial view on the economics of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 155-173.
  5. Hartley, Keith, 2007. "The Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial Policies," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
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