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Drones: Public Interest, Public Choice, and the Expansion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

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  • Hall Abigail R.

    (Department of Economics, George Mason University, MS 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA)

Abstract

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or “drones” have become a core component of the US military arsenal following September 11, 2001. In much of the literature and public discourse regarding drones, it is assumed that drone policy is created within the broader “public interest.” That is, those who construct drone policy set aside private incentives and other motives to construct policy solely to achieve the goals of US citizens and maximize some larger social welfare function. This paper identifies the conjectures associated with this public interest ideal and examines their accuracy. I find a general disconnect between the evidence and the public interest assumption. In several cases, the evidence directly contradicts the assumption of public interest. In light of these findings I offer an alternative analytical framework, the “public choice” framework to adjudicate between observed realities and stated goals.

Suggested Citation

  • Hall Abigail R., 2015. "Drones: Public Interest, Public Choice, and the Expansion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 273-300, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:21:y:2015:i:2:p:273-300:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2014-0043
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, Enero.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; public interest; public choice; drones; unmanned aerial vehicles;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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