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Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?

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  • David, Amdur
  • Ethan, Schmick

Abstract

We compare the strategy and direct-response methods in a one-shot trust game with hidden action. In our experiment, the decision elicitation method affects neither participants' behavior nor their beliefs about this behavior. We conclude that the direct-response method does not, by itself, induce guilt aversion.

Suggested Citation

  • David, Amdur & Ethan, Schmick, 2012. "Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?," MPRA Paper 40148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40148
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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
    3. Reuben, Ernesto & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2009. "Is mistrust self-fulfilling?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 89-91, August.
    4. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
    5. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2010. "Bare promises: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 281-283, May.
    6. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2010. "Testing guilt aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 95-107, January.
    7. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Narita, Yusuke, 2014. "Guilt aversion revisited: An experimental test of a new model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 1-9.
    8. Christoph Vanberg, 2008. "Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1467-1480, November.
    9. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation," International Economic Association Series, in: L.-A. Gérard-Varet & S.-C. Kolm & J. Mercier Ythier (ed.), The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, chapter 7, pages 153-173, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2007. "Guilt in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 170-176, May.
    11. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    12. David Amdur & Ethan Schmick, 2013. "Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 687-693.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Smith, 2013. "Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-8, July.
    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2022. "Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 833-882, September.
    3. David Amdur & Ethan Schmick, 2013. "Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 687-693.
    4. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2023. "Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 690-717.
    5. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-03620418 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Cartwright, Edward, 2019. "A survey of belief-based guilt aversion in trust and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 430-444.
    7. Chen, Jingnan & Houser, Daniel, 2019. "Broken promises and hidden partnerships: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 754-774.
    8. Shoji, Masahiro, 2017. "Eliciting Guilt Sensitivity to Predict Real-World Behavior," MPRA Paper 81451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Masahiro Shoji, 2014. "Channels of Peer Effects and Guilt Aversion in Crime: Experimental and Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-923, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trust; guilt aversion; strategy method; direct-response method; behavioral economics; experimental economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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