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Effects of groups and government size on information disclosure


  • Yamamura, Eiji


This paper uses data from Japan to ascertain the determinants of government information disclosures by considering the role of special interest groups and government size. A IV-Tobit model is employed to control for endogeneity bias of government size. The major findings are as follows: (1) special interest groups have a detrimental effect on information disclosure; (2) special interest groups and an aging population increase government size; and (3) information disclosure ordinances are more likely to be enacted with a large government size.

Suggested Citation

  • Yamamura, Eiji, 2012. "Effects of groups and government size on information disclosure," MPRA Paper 36141, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:36141

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, January.
    2. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451.
    3. Knack, Stephen, 2003. "Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(3-4), pages 341-355, December.
    4. Sambit Bhattacharyya & Raghbendra Jha, 2013. "Economic Growth, Law, and Corruption: Evidence from India," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 55(2), pages 287-313, June.
    5. Roumeen Islam, 2006. "Does More Transparency Go Along With Better Governance?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 121-167, July.
    6. Yamamura, Eiji, 2011. "Decomposition of the effect of government size on growth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 230-232, September.
    7. Heckelman, Jac C, 2000. "Consistent Estimates of the Impact of Special Interest Groups on Economic Growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 319-327, September.
    8. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    9. Christian Bruns & Oliver Himmler, 2011. "Newspaper Circulation and Local Government Efficiency," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113, pages 470-492, June.
    10. Yamamura, Eiji, 2010. "Public policy, trust and growth: disclosure of government information in Japan," MPRA Paper 27703, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, May.
    12. Alt, James E. & Lassen, David Dreyer, 2006. "Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1403-1439, August.
    13. Monica Escaleras & Shu Lin & Charles Register, 2010. "Freedom of information acts and public sector corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 435-460, December.
    14. Yamamura, Eiji, 2011. "Frequency of contact with foreigners in a homogeneous society: perceived consequences of foreigner increases," MPRA Paper 33852, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Doi, Takero & Ihori, Toshihiro, 2002. "Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Interest Groups in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 492-511, December.
    16. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen & Shanna Rose, 2006. "The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the U.S. States," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(si), pages 1-2.
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    More about this item


    pecial interest group; Government size; Information-disclosure ordinance;

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies


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