Effects of groups and government size on information disclosure
This paper uses data from Japan to ascertain the determinants of government information disclosures by considering the role of special interest groups and government size. A IV-Tobit model is employed to control for endogeneity bias of government size. The major findings are as follows: (1) special interest groups have a detrimental effect on information disclosure; (2) special interest groups and an aging population increase government size; and (3) information disclosure ordinances are more likely to be enacted with a large government size.
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