Financial crises, asymmetric information and argumentation
This paper aims to explore the relevance of the Asymmetric Information and the Theory of Argumentation TA in the complex area of financial crises. Specifically, we investigated the scope of the phenomenon of persuasion in advertising. It examines advertisements in publications notable economic movement in Colombia. The financial communication is important to distinguish how to run the models of behavior based on beliefs of agents. Consequently, investors' beliefs can also change systematically with changes in market prices
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
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