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Optimal monetary policy and default

  • Lizarazo, Sandra
  • Da-Rocha, Jose-Maria

In a context in which individuals might default on their debts and subsequently be excluded from credit markets, holding money helps agents smooth their consumption during periods in which they cannot borrow. Therefore holding money makes the punishment to default less severe. In this context, by affecting money demand, monetary policy can affect incentives to default; determining optimal monetary policy can then be thought of as equivalent to choosing the optimal default rate. Since each economy might have a different optimal default rate, each economy might have a different optimal monetary policy different from the Friedman rule. Specifically, we compare the US to Colombia, using a model with idiosyncratic labor income risk and fiat money. Given differences in enforcement of debt contracts, and differences in income variability and persistence, we find that high inflation is costlier for developing countries compared to developed countries.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31931/1/MPRA_paper_31931.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31931.

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Date of creation: 29 Jun 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31931
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  2. Bullard, James & Keating, John W., 1995. "The long-run relationship between inflation and output in postwar economies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 477-496, December.
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  8. Bewley, Truman, 1983. "A Difficulty with the Optimum Quantity of Money," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(5), pages 1485-504, September.
  9. Ahmet Akyol, 2000. "Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy with Incomplete Markets and Idiosyncratic Shocks," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0796, Econometric Society.
  10. Yann Algan & Xavier Ragot, 2010. "Monetary policy with Heterogeneous Agents and Borrowing Constraints," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 295-316, April.
  11. Hernando Zuleta & Julián David Parada & Jacobo Campo & Andrés García, 2009. "Capital natural, capital humano y participación de los factores. Una revisión de los métodos de medición del crecimiento económico," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 004713, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
  12. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1993. "Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving," Working Papers 502, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  13. Igor Livshits & James MacGee & Michele Tertilt, 2006. "Accounting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20066, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
  14. Satyajit Chatterjee & Dean Corbae & Makoto Nakajima & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 2002. "A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default," Centro de Alti­simos Estudios Ri­os Pe©rez(CAERP) 2, Centro de Altisimos Estudios Rios Perez (CAERP).
  15. Jafarey, Saqib & Rupert, Peter, 2001. "Limited Commitment, Money, and Credit," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 22-58, July.
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