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Is regulatory quality related to industry performance? Evidence on telecommunications, gas and electricity in EU15


  • Ugur, Mehmet


This paper provides empirical evidence on ex ante and ex post indicators of regulatory quality and the relationship between those indicators and market performance in liberalised EU-15 network industries. We report a low level of regulatory independence and competence, a high level of cross-country variations in regulatory quality, and a prevalent absence of correlation between ex ante regulatory quality and ex post performance indicators. On the basis of these findings, we suggest that the design of national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in Europe is not optimal and may be conducive to regulatory ineffectiveness or outright regulatory failure. Nevertheless, the existence and strengthening of EU-level regulators could enable EU member states to reduce the risk of regulatory failure by encouraging coordination and adoption of best practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Ugur, Mehmet, 2009. "Is regulatory quality related to industry performance? Evidence on telecommunications, gas and electricity in EU15," MPRA Paper 31365, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31365

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Giandomenico Majone, 2000. "The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 273-302, June.
    2. William D. Berry, 1982. "Theories Of Regulatory Impact: The Roles Of The Regulator, The Regulated, And The Public," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 1(3), pages 436-441, February.
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    More about this item


    Economics of Regulation; European Public Policy; Regulatory Quality; European Network Industries.;

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L38 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Policy
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation


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