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Contract enforcement, litigation, and economic development

Author

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  • Massenot, Baptiste

Abstract

This paper introduces a model of litigation in a growth framework. Investors use litigation to enforce their financial contracts with entrepreneurs. A contest ensues in which both agents hire lawyers to increase their probability of winning the trial. The issue and the cost of the contest determine how much investors are willing to lend. More lawyers are hired when judicial efficiency is lower and damages are higher. Higher judicial efficiency and tighter restrictions on the supply of lawyers benefit the economy, while the impact of higher damages is ambiguous. Some empirical evidence is also presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Massenot, Baptiste, 2010. "Contract enforcement, litigation, and economic development," MPRA Paper 27501, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27501
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
    2. Nicola Gennaioli & Enrico Perotti, 2009. "Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation," Economics Working Papers 1329, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2012.
    3. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    4. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni, 2013. "Legal Institutions, Innovation, And Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 937-956, August.
    5. Massenot, Baptiste, 2011. "Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 602-608.
    6. Rui Castro & Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn MacDonald, 2004. "Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 1131-1175.
    7. Katz, Avery, 1988. "Judicial decisionmaking and litigation expenditure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 127-143, December.
    8. Paolo Buonanno & Matteo M. Galizzi, 2009. "Advocatus, et non latro? Testing the supplier-induced demand hypothesis for Italian courts of justice," Working Papers 0914, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    9. Bond Philip, 2009. "Contracting in the Presence of Judicial Agency," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-34, November.
    10. Nicola Gennaioli, 2013. "Optimal Contracts With Enforcement Risk," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 59-82, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lin, Hui Ling & Pukthuanthong, Kuntara & Walker, Thomas John, 2013. "An international look at the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis of IPO underpricing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 56-77.
    2. Massenot, Baptiste, 2011. "Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 602-608.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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