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Emergence of alternative capital markets in developing countries as a process of institutional change

  • Waśniewski, Krzysztof

The present paper attempts to assess whether at all and in what ways the development of alternative capital markets may help an additional mobilisation of the given economy's domestic financial resources, and, consequently, contribute significantly to economic development. Against the theoretical background of both the old and the new institutional schools, a model of institutional change, leading to the emergence of alternative capital markets, is introduced. Using the theory of games as the theoretical tool to formalize, the model leads to conclude that the institutional change in question is only partial and incremental. In the same time, it demonstrates that if developing countries already have or can create strong technological hubs in their territories, alternative capital markets can spur technological progress and economic growth, even if the main capital markets, being the benchmark for those, are in other countries.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26681/1/MPRA_paper_26681.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26681.

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Date of creation: 14 Nov 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26681
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