IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/25234.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Constraining the spending behavior of subnational governments through borrowing limitation: The case of Malaysia

Author

Listed:
  • Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah
  • Abdul Karim, Noor Al-Huda

Abstract

In literature, subnational governments have been identified as being prone to fiscal profligacy. In response to this problem, some countries choose to put a limit on the borrowing capacity of the state and local governments. This is notably the case for Malaysia with the enactment of Article 111 (12) of the Constitution. However it remains to be answered whether such regulation really has an impact on the spending behavior of the state governments. This paper attempts to shed some light on this question by employing the methodology usually found in the study of intertemporal behavior. The underlying objective is to examine whether a decision to further decentralize the economy in the future will not be translated into macroeconomic instability due to the fiscally irresponsible behavior of the state governments. Indeed such eventuality can be avoided if the federal government has what it takes in order to put the spending behavior of the state governments under control. Our findings point to the conclusion that the regulation has failed to produce a significant effect on the spending behavior of the state governments. The results indicate that the state governments in Malaysia manage to observe a forward looking behavior implying that they are not subject to any liquidity constraint.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah & Abdul Karim, Noor Al-Huda, 2008. "Constraining the spending behavior of subnational governments through borrowing limitation: The case of Malaysia," MPRA Paper 25234, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25234
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25234/1/MPRA_paper_25234.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hall, Robert E, 1978. "Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(6), pages 971-987, December.
    2. Zeldes, Stephen P, 1989. "Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 305-346, April.
    3. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
    4. Jin, Jing & Zou, Heng-fu, 2002. "How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 270-293, September.
    5. Holtz-Eakin Douglas & Rosen Harvey S. & Tilly Schuyler, 1994. "Intertemporal Analysis of State and Local Government Spending: Theory and Tests," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 159-174, March.
    6. Juan Pablo Nicolini & Josefina Posadas & Juan Sanguinetti & Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina," Research Department Publications 3160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    7. Francesca Fornasari & Steven B. Webb & Heng-fu Zou, 2000. "The Macroeconomic Impact of Decentralized Spending and Deficits: International Evidence," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 403-433, November.
    8. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
    10. Bohn, Henning & Inman, Robert P., 1996. "Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 13-76, December.
    11. Borge, L.E. & Dahleberg, M. & Tovmo, P., 2001. "The Intertemporal Spending Behavior of Local Governments : A Comparative Analysis of the Scandinavian Countries," Papers 2001:10, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
    12. Wildasin, David E., 1997. "Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank.
    13. Dahlberg, Matz & Lindström , Tomas, 1996. "Are Local Governments Governed by Forward Looking Decision Makers?," Working Paper Series 1996:20, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    14. Christopher D. Carroll & Miles S. Kimball, 2001. "Liquidity Constraints and Precautionary Saving," NBER Working Papers 8496, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Karen E. Dynan, 1993. "How prudent are consumers?," Working Paper Series / Economic Activity Section 135, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    17. Jones, Mark P. & Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2000. "Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system: an analysis of the Argentine provinces," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 305-333, April.
    18. Albarran, P., 2000. "Income Uncertainty and Precautionary Saving: Evidence from Household Rotating Panel Data," Papers 0008, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
    19. Dynan, Karen E, 1993. "How Prudent Are Consumers?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 1104-1113, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal Federalism; subnational borrowings; institutional restriction; consumption smoothing.;

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25234. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.