Contrôle et régulation du marché boursier : un problème de risque moral
[THE Stock Market Control and Regulation: A Moral Hazard Problem]
In most of case, the insider trading is a behavior transgression of law, it is a practice deemed illegal by law. This practice is unfair and opaque; it distorts the confidence and equality of investors to make trading in the market. An insider acting or allows other intermediaries to act in the total absence of hazards, and thus achieve a profitable operations with the abnormal returns. The insider trading is given by using the inside (i.e., the privileged) information, not yet released or revealed publicly. In this paper we deal with the issue of ethical behavior of insider trading in the Moroccan regulated markets. Initially, we review some elements at the base of ethics of financial markets. In a second point, we highlight the legal arsenal to fight against the illegal insider trading. In fact, we shall present its administrative, civil and criminal components, we then show its usefulness and we finally formulate against it some critiques. Based on these elements and by referring to the theory of Principal/Agent in the asymmetric information, we try to model the insider behavior by extending the model to two Agents and one Principal.
|Date of creation:||17 Nov 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
" A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, "undated". "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 1777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 6274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
- Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Variation sur le thème 'A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise'," Working Papers CREGO 011201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Jul 2002.
- Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1998. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 1(2), pages 57-88, June.
- Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1997. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Working Papers CREGO 0970801, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19819. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.