On the Truly Noncooperative Game of Life on Earth: Darwin, Hardin, & Ostrom's Nontrivial Errors
This paper introduces a game-theoretical framework for The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, axioms which help clarify the problem itself, and, reductio ad absurdum, falsify many widely-held economic, evolutionary, and ecological principles. This brief communiqué lays the foundation for evolutionary stable economic development and survival strategies – strategies which foster international cooperation, global threat mitigation, food & energy security, long-distance dispersibility, and thus, ultimately, the long-term survival of the human species.
|Date of creation:||18 Dec 2009|
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- Funk, Matt, 2009. "On the Truly Noncooperative Game of Life on Earth: In Search of the Unity of Nature & Evolutionary Stable Strategy," MPRA Paper 16534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Paul Ehrlich & Anne Ehrlich, 2008. "Nature’s Economy and the Human Economy," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(1), pages 9-16, January.
- Funk, Matt, 2009. "On the Travesty of the Tragedy of the Commons: Hardin's Nontrivial Error," MPRA Paper 19203, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Funk, Matt, 2009. "On the Problem of Economic Power: Lessons from the Natural History of the Hawaiian Archipelago," MPRA Paper 19371, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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