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Constitutional Design and Political Communication

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  • Xefteris, Dimitrios

Abstract

This paper models the constitutional design process, and points out the importance of political communication (defined as the level of information about the social distribution of policy preferences that individuals hold, at the time of this process) on the "extent" of "democratic restraints" of the socially preferred constitution and on the welfare derived by the society from its implementation. The results demonstrate that the level of political communication has a positive effect on the level of democracy of the socially preferred constitution and on social welfare. Moreover, it is proved that, even if there exist no tolerance for dictatorship by societies in general, the level of democracy demanded by the society, reaches the maximum possible level, only if political communication is "perfect". That is, the socially preferred constitution in cases of "imperfect" political communication incorporates both dictatorial and democratic elements.

Suggested Citation

  • Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2009. "Constitutional Design and Political Communication," MPRA Paper 18490, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:18490
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18490/1/MPRA_paper_18490.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    2. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 1011-1048.
    3. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611.
    4. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    constitution; political communication; democracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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