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Bank supervisory arrangements: International evidence and Indian perspective

Listed author(s):
  • Narain, Aditya
  • Ghosh, Saibal

Historically, central banks have had the dual objective of safeguarding monetary and financial stability. Increasingly, over the last two decades or so, concerns about financial stability have gained prominence, reflecting the growing number, breadth and severity of bouts of financial distress. At the same time, the role of central banks in safeguarding financial stability has been evolving. In part, this has resulted from developments in the financial system in the wake of liberalisation and innovation. More recently, some central banks have been divested of their supervisory responsibilities through changes in legislation. Structurally, as the blurring of distinction between different types of institutions (banks, securities firms and insurance companies) continues, there remains the issue of whether single or multiple supervisory authorities should be the norm and whether the central bank should be assigned any supervisory role. In this context, the present chapter seeks to understand the cross-country evidence with regard to regulation and supervision. The purpose of the Chapter is to delineate the extant arrangements of regulation and supervision and whether supervisory authority in respective countries is conducted monopolistically by the central bank or shared with other supervisory authorities. Such an analysis seeks to achieve two broad objectives: (a) whether and to what extent do different countries exhibit different supervisory arrangements and (b) on the basis of available evidence, what broad inferences can be gleaned regarding the synergies between supervision and monetary policy?

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17454.

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Date of creation: 2001
Publication status: Published in Economic and Political Weekly 37.36(2001): pp. 3543-3553
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17454
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  1. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653.
  2. Di Noia, Carmine & Di Giorgio, Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-378, November.
  3. Richard K. Abrams & Michael W Taylor, 2000. "Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 00/213, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Reinhart, Carmen & Goldstein, Morris & Kaminsky, Graciela, 2000. "Assessing financial vulnerability, an early warning system for emerging markets: Introduction," MPRA Paper 13629, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
  6. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
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