[Language as Human Capital: Labor Specialization, Organizational Communication and Language Acquisition]
From the perspective of labor division and specialization, we explained the human capital attributes of language, and pointed out the human capital was depended on the acquisition of specialized organizational language which is the standard code system in the process of organizational communication. Then we employed the "beauty contest game" to analyze the two-stage language acquisition decision of individual, and pointed out that first stage language acquisition was to gain the advantages of human capital competition in the second stage. The model we employed has shown the importance and mechanism of private information and public information in the individual language acquisition decision making process. In the end, we briefly analyzed factors which determined the formation and diffusion of private and public information.
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