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Flood Insurance Coverage in the Coastal Zone

Author

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  • Landry, Craig E.
  • Jahan-Parvar, Mohammad R.

Abstract

We explore behavior and test theory regarding the determinants of flood insurance coverage in the coastal zone using household-level data for nine southeastern counties. We use Tobit regression models to assess the importance and magnitude of insurance cost, risk factors, community characteristics, and household attributes on flood insurance purchase for residential building structures. Overall estimates indicate price inelastic demand, though subsidized policyholders are more sensitive to price and hold greater flood insurance coverage (controlling for value of asset at risk). We find support for rational choice in the coastal zone, with flood insurance coverage positively correlated in the level of flood risk. We find evidence that coastal erosion risk effects flood insurance demand, and that community level erosion hazard mitigation projects influence flood insurance holdings, with shoreline armoring appearing to act as a substitute and beach replenishment appearing to act as a complement.

Suggested Citation

  • Landry, Craig E. & Jahan-Parvar, Mohammad R., 2008. "Flood Insurance Coverage in the Coastal Zone," MPRA Paper 15498, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15498
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kunreuther, Howard & Sanderson, Warren & Vetschera, Rudolf, 1985. "A behavioral model of the adoption of protective activities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-15, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Céline Grislain-Letremy, 2013. "Natural Disters : Exposure and Underinsurance," Working Papers 2013-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Mark Browne & Christian Knoller & Andreas Richter, 2015. "Behavioral bias and the demand for bicycle and flood insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 141-160, April.
    3. Andor, Mark & Osberghaus, Daniel & Simora, Michael, 2017. "Natural disasters and governmental aid: Is there a charity hazard?," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-065, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    4. Atreya, Ajita & Ferreira, Susana & Michel-Kerjan, Erwann, 2015. "What drives households to buy flood insurance? New evidence from Georgia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 153-161.
    5. repec:bla:jrinsu:v:84:y:2017:i:3:p:819-850 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Achtnicht, Martin & Osberghaus, Daniel, 2016. "The demand for index-based flood insurance in a high-income country," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-051, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13276 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Abdul-Akeem Sadiq & Douglas Noonan, 2015. "Local capacity and resilience to flooding: community responsiveness to the community ratings system program incentives," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 78(2), pages 1413-1428, September.
    9. Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Raschky & Howard Kunreuther, 2015. "Corporate Demand for Insurance: New Evidence From the U.S. Terrorism and Property Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(3), pages 505-530, September.
    10. Frimpong, Eugene & Petrolia, Daniel, 2016. "Community-level Flood Mitigation Effects on Household Flood Insurance and Damage Claims," 2016 Annual Meeting, February 6-9, 2016, San Antonio, Texas 230129, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    11. Bin, Okmyung & Landry, Craig E., 2013. "Changes in implicit flood risk premiums: Empirical evidence from the housing market," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 361-376.
    12. repec:eee:jeeman:v:87:y:2018:i:c:p:150-164 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:spr:nathaz:v:88:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11069-017-2863-x is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Ling Tian & Peng Yao, 2015. "Preferences for earthquake insurance in rural China: factors influencing individuals’ willingness to pay," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 79(1), pages 93-110, October.
    15. Tsvetan Tsvetanov & Farhed Shah, 2013. "The economic value of delaying adaptation to sea-level rise: An application to coastal properties in Connecticut," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 121(2), pages 177-193, November.
    16. Grislain-Letrémy, Céline, 2012. "Assurance et prévention des catastrophes naturelles et technologiques," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/9073 edited by Villeneuve, Bertrand, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insurance coverage; flood; hazard; coastal; erosion; Tobit model;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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