Propiedad, gobierno corporativo y las estrategias de diversificación de las empresas mexicanas: Un estudio exploratorio
[Ownership, corporate governance and diversification strategies of Mexican firms: An exploratory study]
The objective of this paper is to study the existing relations among ownership, corporate governance, and strategies of diversification of Mexican firms. The information corresponds to a sample of 99 non-financed companies listed in the BMV (Mexican Stock Exchange) in 2004. The study of property follows the concentration of ownership and control, family participation, and the type of control of the majority owners, whereas the study of the corporative governance includes the size, composition, and structure of the board of directors. The statistical technique for the resistance of the hypotheses is T-Test for independent samples. The following results were found: Firms with ownership and control concentration have boards with fewer members and committees. Family firms tend to select strategies with little or no product diversification. When fideicommissum in the ownership exists, firms have bigger and more independent boards, and they form evaluation committees. Firms that issued ADR’s have committees of evaluation also, although they are not independents. Firms with boards of greater size and independence tend to move toward greater diversification of markets and they form fewer independent committees. Finally, firms that form executive committees tend toward strategies of product diversification.
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- Ramón A. Castillo Ponce, 2007. "Entre familia y amigos: la elección de la estructura de propiedad corporativa," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 22(1), pages 3-18.
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- Hoshino, Taeko, 2004. "Family Business in Mexico: Responses to Human Resource Limitations and Management Succession," IDE Discussion Papers 12, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
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