Zum Spannungsfeld zwischen staatlicher und privater Wirtschaft am Beispiel der postsowjetischen Staaten
[On the interaction of public and private businesses: Example of the post-Soviet space]
The paper discusses the impact of state-business conflicts on the process of economic and political transition in the post-Soviet countries. After providing a short overview of main aspects of state-business relations and of the institutional equilibrium in the post-Soviet world, it continues by setting up the list of possible variables influencing the outcomes and the process of conflicts, and determining whether the conflict is able to provide incentives for establishing more efficient institutions or will maintain (and even re-enforce) the existing inefficient paths of the post-Soviet countries.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
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Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Ichiro Iwasaki, 2003.
"Evolution of the Government–Business Relationship and Economic Performance in the Former Soviet States – Order State, Rescue State, Punish State,"
Economic Change and Restructuring,
Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 223-257, September.
- Ichiro Iwasaki, 2004. "Evolution of the Government–Business Relationship and Economic Performance in the Former Soviet States – Order State, Rescue State, Punish State," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 223-257, September.
- Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003.
"Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia,"
w0031, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Baumol, William J, 1990. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 893-921, October.
- Sonin, Konstantin, 2003.
"Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights,"
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 715-731, December.
- Konstantin Sonin, 2003. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," Working Papers w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Konstantin Sonin, 2002. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 544, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Oleinik, Anton, 2005. "Transfer of Institutions: Actors and Constraints - The Russian Case in a Global Context," HWWA Discussion Papers 320, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
- R. Hirschowitz, 1989. "The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 57(4), pages 266-272, December.
- Libman, Alexander, 2007. "Ex ante and ex post institutional convergence: Case of the post-Soviet space," MPRA Paper 10938, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Leonid Polishchuk & Alexei Savvateev, 2004. "Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 12(1), pages 103-127, 03.
- Anders Aslund, 2005. "Comparative Oligarchy: Russia, Ukraine and the United States," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0296, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
- Libman, Alexander, 2006. "Different paths of the second transition in the post-Soviet world: a political-economic analysis," MPRA Paper 11781, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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