Globalization and outcomes of institutional competition
Institutional competition, or competition of countries for mobile individuals and organizations by changing the system of formal institutions and adopting it to the demands of mobile groups and individuals, is considered to be an important element of globalization. A popular view is, that institutional competition improves the quality of institutions, because it acts as discovery process and additional control mechanism for the government. The outcome of institutional competition is always better institutions. Hidden assumptions underlying this thesis are first, that the individuals and organizations prefer transaction-cost-efficient institutions and second, that the government is interested in attracting mobile individuals and organizations. These assumptions, however, are correct only under specific institutional environment. There are different reasons for individuals to support low-quality institutions (including the redistribution effects, path dependence and mental models and deficit of trust). Governments may also prefer low immigration. Do these reasons exist also under environment of institutional competition? The main question is also, whether the new logic created by institutional competition changes old behavior patterns and establishes better institutions, or outcomes of institutional competition are shaped by original institutional environment and may be inefficient? The paper supports the second answer analyzing experience of post-Soviet states.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ichiro Iwasaki, 2003.
"Evolution of the Government–Business Relationship and Economic Performance in the Former Soviet States – Order State, Rescue State, Punish State,"
Economic Change and Restructuring,
Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 223-257, September.
- Ichiro Iwasaki, 2004. "Evolution of the Government–Business Relationship and Economic Performance in the Former Soviet States – Order State, Rescue State, Punish State," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 223-257, September.
- Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003.
"Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia,"
w0031, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Leonid Polishchuk & Alexei Savvateev, 2004. "Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 12(1), pages 103-127, 03.
- Konstantin Sonin, 2003.
"Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights,"
w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. "Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 715-731, December.
- Konstantin Sonin, 2002. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 544, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Kislitsyna Olga, 2003. "Income Inequality in Russia during Transition: How Can it be Explained?," EERC Working Paper Series 03-08e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
- Marek Dabrowski & Radzislawa Gortat, 2002. "Political Determinants of Economic Reforms in Former Communist Countries," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0242, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
- Paul DiMaggio, 1998. "The New Institutionalisms: Avenues of Collaboration," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(4), pages 696-, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11779. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.