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‘Market Discipline’, Lending Ceilings And Subnational Finance

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  • Londero, Elio

Abstract

The ‘market discipline’ approach to subnational finance requires that moral hazard derived from the possibility of a central government bailout be made insignificantly small. Therefore, governments interested in following this approach and willing to abide by its rules should start by creating the conditions for a default and its resolution to be possible. This article discusses the use of lending ceilings as an instrument to allow the default without dragging in the central government.

Suggested Citation

  • Londero, Elio, 2005. "‘Market Discipline’, Lending Ceilings And Subnational Finance," MPRA Paper 100411, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:100411
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dillinger,William R. & Webb,Steven Benjamin, 1999. "Fiscal management in federal democracies : Argentina and Brazil," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2121, The World Bank.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lending ceilings; fiscal institutions; subnational finance; banking regulations; moral hazard; market discipline; bailout;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing

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