IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pkk/wpaper/1012.rdf.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Prospects after the voting reform of the Lisbon Treaty

Author

Listed:
  • László Á. Kóczy

    (Óbuda University)

Abstract

The European Union used to make decisions by unanimity or near unanimity. After a series of extensions, with 27 member states the present decision making mechanisms have become very slow and assigned power to the members in an arbitrary way. The new decision rules accepted as part of the Lisbon Treaty did not only make decision making far easier, but streamlined the process by removing the most controversial element: the voting weights. The new system relies entirely on population data. We look at the immediate impact of the reform as well as the long term effects of the different demographic trends in the 27 member states. We find that the Lisbon rules benefit the largest member states, while medium sized countries, especially Central Eastern European countries suffer the biggest losses.

Suggested Citation

  • László Á. Kóczy, 2010. "Prospects after the voting reform of the Lisbon Treaty," Working Paper Series 1012, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1012.rdf
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://uni-obuda.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/1012.pdf
    File Function: Manuscript, 2010
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philip Straffin, 1977. "Homogeneity, independence, and power indices," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 107-118, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Lisbon prospects
      by László Kóczy in Game theory, research & other stuff on 2010-09-16 15:12:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Meyer, Eric, 2013. "Die Macht der Mitgliedstaaten im Ministerrat der EU und im Ministerrat für Fragen der Währungsunion nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon," Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 36, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Saari, Donald G. & Sieberg, Katri K., 2001. "Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 241-263, August.
    2. Terrence Levesque, 1984. "Measuring state power in presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 295-310, January.
    3. D. Kilgour & Terrence Levesque, 1984. "The Canadian constitutional amending formula: Bargaining in the past and the future," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 457-480, January.
    4. Serguei Kaniovski, 2008. "The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 281-300, August.
    5. Dia, Ibrahima & Kamwa, Eric, 2017. "Le Pouvoir de Vote dans les Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe [The Voting Power in the Inter-communal Council of Martinique and Guadeloupe]," MPRA Paper 80572, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Fabrice Barthelemy & Mathieu Martin, 2011. "A Comparison Between the Methods of Apportionment Using Power Indices: the Case of the US Presidential Elections," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 87-106.
    7. Thomas König & Thomas Bräuninger, 1998. "The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 125-142, January.
    8. Widgrén, Mika, 2008. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making," Discussion Papers 1162, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    9. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2002. "Inequality among EU citizens in the EU's Council decision procedure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 475-498, September.
    10. Madeleine Hosli & Rebecca Moody & Bryan O’Donovan & Serguei Kaniovski & Anna Little, 2011. "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 163-187, July.
    11. Dominique Lepelley & Vincent R Merlin & Jean-louis Rouet & Laurent Vidu, 2014. "Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(4), pages 2201-2207.
    12. Mika Widgren, 2003. "Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules," European Economy Group Working Papers 23, European Economy Group.
    13. Serguei Kaniovski & Alexander Zaigraev, 2018. "The probability of majority inversion in a two-stage voting system with three states," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 525-546, June.
    14. Diana Cheng & Peter Coughlin, 2017. "Using equations from power indices to analyze figure skating teams," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 231-251, March.
    15. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2016. "Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 11-22.
    16. René van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2009. "Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-052/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. René Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2013. "Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 671-683, September.
    18. Dennis Leech, 2002. "An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(1), pages 1-22, March.
    19. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2005. "The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(3), pages 377-387, July.
    20. Mika WidgrÚn & Stefan Napel, 2002. "The Power of a Spatially Inferior Player," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 19, pages 327-343.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Union; Council of Ministers; quali ed majority voting; Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; demographics.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1012.rdf. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alexandra Vécsey (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/gkbmfhu.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.