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Prospects after the voting reform of the Lisbon Treaty

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  • László Á. Kóczy

    () (Óbuda University)

Abstract

The European Union used to make decisions by unanimity or near unanimity. After a series of extensions, with 27 member states the present decision making mechanisms have become very slow and assigned power to the members in an arbitrary way. The new decision rules accepted as part of the Lisbon Treaty did not only make decision making far easier, but streamlined the process by removing the most controversial element: the voting weights. The new system relies entirely on population data. We look at the immediate impact of the reform as well as the long term effects of the different demographic trends in the 27 member states. We find that the Lisbon rules benefit the largest member states, while medium sized countries, especially Central Eastern European countries suffer the biggest losses.

Suggested Citation

  • László Á. Kóczy, 2010. "Prospects after the voting reform of the Lisbon Treaty," Working Paper Series 1012, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1012.rdf
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    File URL: http://uni-obuda.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/1012.pdf
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Lisbon prospects
      by László Kóczy in Game theory, research & other stuff on 2010-09-16 15:12:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Meyer, Eric, 2013. "Die Macht der Mitgliedstaaten im Ministerrat der EU und im Ministerrat für Fragen der Währungsunion nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon," Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 36, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Union; Council of Ministers; quali ed majority voting; Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; demographics.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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