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Dinámica de inversión y competencia en generación eléctrica en un escenario de liberalización en el Perú: La importancia de los contratos de largo plazo

Author

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  • Arnold Rubén Rivasplata Ramírez

    (Departamento de Economía de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)

  • Raúl Lizardo García Carpio

Abstract

Se analiza el comportamiento de los grupos de generación eléctrica que toman decisiones sobre inversión y producción, en un escenario de mercado liberalizado introduciendo contratos de largo plazo, en un contexto donde hay alto nivel de concentración de mercado. Para ello, se emplea un modelo determinístico dinámico de competencia imperfecta (con estrategias open loop) que se resuelve utilizando un sistema de ecuaciones complementarias mediante el software GAMS, a fin de proveer simulaciones que muestren los impactos de las diferentes estructuras de mercado (monopolio, oligopolio con franja competitiva, oligopolio (Cournot) y competencia perfecta) sobre las decisiones de inversión y producción, asumiendo la existencia de dos bloques horarios (base y pico) y considerando la existencia de dos tecnologías a utilizarse para el despacho eléctrico (hidráulica y térmica) con datos del año base 2011 para un horizonte temporal de 10 años. Los resultados muestran que a pesar de que en los diferentes escenarios de análisis puedan existir indicios de poder de mercado, existe un efecto positivo importante sobre la inversión en capacidad, la producción por tecnología, y precios por bloque de horario. Para un mercado oligopólico con franja competitiva, se observa que contratando el 70% de energía hidráulica y el 66% de energía térmica en el año base, la inversión en capacidad con tecnología hidráulica incrementa en 7,18% (sobreinversión) y con tecnología térmica disminuye en 2,27% (subinversión); mientras que la producción, con tecnología hidráulica incrementa en 3,67%, mientras que bajo tecnología térmica, 4,58%. El precio en hora base disminuye en 9,83% y en hora pico, 4,45%. JEL Classification-JEL: C61 , C73 , L13

Suggested Citation

  • Arnold Rubén Rivasplata Ramírez & Raúl Lizardo García Carpio, 2018. "Dinámica de inversión y competencia en generación eléctrica en un escenario de liberalización en el Perú: La importancia de los contratos de largo plazo," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers 2018-457, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
  • Handle: RePEc:pcp:pucwps:wp00457
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Decisiones de inversión ; Equilibrio de Nash ; Juegos dinámicos ; Mercado eléctrico ; Oligopolio ; Optimización ; Poder de Mercado ; Teoría de juegos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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