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Investment in Electricity Markets with Asymmetric Technologies


  • Talat S. Genc

    () (University of Guelph, Department of Economics)

  • Henry Thille

    () (University of Guelph, Department of Economics)


We study competition between hydro and thermal electricity generators under demand uncertainty. Producers compete in quantities and each is constrained: the thermal generator by capacity and the hydro generator by water availability. We analyze a two-period game emphasizing the incentives for capacity investments by the thermal generator. We characterize both Markov perfect and open-loop equilibria. In the Markov perfect equilibrium, investment is discontinuous in initial capacity and higher than it is in the open-loop equilibrium. However, since there are two distortions in the model, equilibrium investment can be either higher or lower than the efficient investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Talat S. Genc & Henry Thille, 2009. "Investment in Electricity Markets with Asymmetric Technologies," Working Papers 0909, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:2009-9

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Genc, Talat S. & Reynolds, Stanley S. & Sen, Suvrajeet, 2007. "Dynamic oligopolistic games under uncertainty: A stochastic programming approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 55-80, January.
    2. Roques Fabien A. & Newbery David M. & Nuttall William J., 2005. "Investment Incentives and Electricity Market Design: the British Experience," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-36, June.
    3. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2006. "The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity," Papers of Peter Cramton 06mdfra, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2006.
    4. Garcia, Alfredo & Reitzes, James D & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2001. "Strategic Pricing when Electricity is Storable," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 223-247, November.
    5. Reynolds, Stanley S, 1986. "Strategic Capital Investment in the American Aluminum Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 225-245, March.
    6. Stefan Ambec & Joseph Doucet, 2003. "Decentralizing hydro power production," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(3), pages 587-607, August.
    7. Genc, Talat S. & Sen, Suvrajeet, 2008. "An analysis of capacity and price trajectories for the Ontario electricity market using dynamic Nash equilibrium under uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 173-191, January.
    8. Bushnell, James & Wolfram, Catherine, 2008. "Electricity Markets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 31547, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    9. Crampes, C. & Moreaux, M., 2001. "Water resource and power generation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 975-997, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simões & Monte, Daniel, 2017. "Competition in cascades," Textos para discussão 456, FGV/EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    2. Lamadrid, Alberto J. & Maneevitjit, Surin & Mount, Timothy D., 2016. "The economic value of transmission lines and the implications for planning models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-15.
    3. Robles, Jack, 2016. "Infinite horizon hydroelectricity games," Working Paper Series 5075, Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance.
    4. repec:eee:ejores:v:266:y:2018:i:3:p:1086-1099 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Electricity markets; Dynamic game; Duopoly; Capacity investment.;

    JEL classification:

    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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