The (in)appropriate benchmark when beliefs are not the only state variable
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References listed on IDEAS
- Freixas, Xavier, 1981. "Optimal growth with experimentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 296-309, April.
- Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "The Ignorant Monopolist: Optimal Learning with Endogenous Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 565-581, August.
- Manjira Datta & Leonard J. Mirman & Edward E. Schlee, 2002. "Optimal Experimentation in Signal Dependent Decision Problems," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 577-608, May.
- Edward E. Schlee & Manjira Datta & Leonard J. Mirman, 2000. "Learning with noiseless information and payoff-relevant signals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(1), pages 63-75.
More about this item
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-18 (All new papers)
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