Learning with noiseless information and payoff-relevant signals
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- Godfrey Keller, 2005. "The (in)appropriate benchmark when beliefs are not the only state variable," Economics Series Working Papers 223, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Godfrey Keller, 2007. "Passive learning: a critique by example," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(2), pages 263-269, November.
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KeywordsLearning; Experimentation; Payoff-relevant signals; Noiseless information; Blackwell's theorem.;
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