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Sometimes Losing Leads to Winning

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  • Pipke, David

Abstract

Seminal evidence from Berger and Pope (2011) shows that teams slightly behind at halftime are more likely to win. A recent study by Klein Teeselink et al. (2023), however, suggests this finding is an artifact confined to the 1999–2009 NBA seasons. Using an independently assembled dataset of 546,628 professional games, I revisit this question with a local regression-discontinuity design. I document that the “behind-at-halftime advantage” is not an artifact: it appears robustly in NBA/ABA play in the late 1960s–early 1970s and in non-U.S. leagues long after the original study. Its attenuation in the modern NBA coincides with strategic adjustments by leading teams, who appear to have learned to counter their opponents’ motivational surge. The results show that reference-dependent motivation is a robust phenomenon, but its expression in equilibrium depends on context and strategic adaptation by opponents.

Suggested Citation

  • Pipke, David, 2025. "Sometimes Losing Leads to Winning," SocArXiv vdpj6_v1, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:vdpj6_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/vdpj6_v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    2. Sutter, Matthias & Kocher, Martin G., 2004. "Favoritism of agents - The case of referees' home bias," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 461-469, August.
    3. Bouke Klein Teeselink & Martijn J. van den Assem & Dennie van Dolder, 2023. "Does Losing Lead to Winning? An Empirical Analysis for Four Sports," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 513-532, January.
    4. Pipke, David, 2025. "No evidence of first-mover advantage in a large sample of penalty shootouts," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    5. Devin G. Pope & Maurice E. Schweitzer, 2011. "Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 129-157, February.
    6. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    7. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence," IEW - Working Papers 393, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. Pipke, David, 2025. "No evidence of first-mover advantage in a large sample of penalty shootouts," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 318391, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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