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Timing of Investment and Dynamic Pricing in Privatized Sectors

Author

Listed:
  • Sandro Brusco

    () (Department of Economics, Stony Brook University)

  • Ornella Tarola

    () (DAES, University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’)

  • Sandro Trento

    () (Dipartimento di informatica e studi aziendali, Facoltà di Economia, Università di Trento)

Abstract

In equipment-intensive sectors — such as water utilities, power generation, gas — billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. We discuss and characterize the optimal policy of a profit-maximizing firm and compare it with the optimal policy of a welfare-maximizing planner. When there is no tecnical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a private firm. With technical progress, we show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs. Under some conditions we also show that when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is shorter for a public firm than for a private firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandro Brusco & Ornella Tarola & Sandro Trento, 2012. "Timing of Investment and Dynamic Pricing in Privatized Sectors," Department of Economics Working Papers 12-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:12-01
    as

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    File URL: http://www.stonybrook.edu/economics/research/papers/2012/BruscoTarolaTrento.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demichelis, S. & Tarola, O., 2006. "Capacity expansion and dynamic monopoly pricing," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 169-178, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic investment; privatization;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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