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'Arranged' Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling: a Model with Evidence from India

Author

Listed:
  • Indraneel Dasgupta,
  • Pushkar Maitra,
  • Diganta Mukherjee

Abstract

We model the consequences of parental control over choice of wives for sons, for parental incentives to educate daughters, when the marriage market exhibits competitive dowry payments and altruistic but paternalistic parents benefit from having married sons live with them. By choosing uneducated brides, some parents can prevent costly household partition. Paternalistic self-interest consequently generates low levels of female schooling in the steady state equilibrium. State payments to parents for educating daughters fail toraise female schooling levels. Policies (such as housing subsidies) that promote nuclear families, interventions against early marriages, and state support to couples who marry against parental wishes, are however all likely to improve female schooling. We offer evidence from India consistent with our theoretical analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Indraneel Dasgupta, & Pushkar Maitra, & Diganta Mukherjee, "undated". "'Arranged' Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling: a Model with Evidence from India," Discussion Papers 06/03, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
  • Handle: RePEc:not:notcre:06/03
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Junsen Zhang & William Chan, 1999. "Dowry and Wife's Welfare: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 786-808, August.
    2. Maristella Botticini & Aloysius Siow, 2003. "Why Dowries?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1385-1398, September.
    3. Frederic Gaspart & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2010. "Strategic Behavior and Marriage Payments: Theory and Evidence from Senegal," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 149-185, October.
    4. Kai A. Konrad & Harald Künemund & Kjell Erik Lommerud & Julio R. Robledo, 2002. "Geography of the Family," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 981-998, September.
    5. Anderson, Siwan, 2007. "Why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 140-152, November.
    6. Siwan Anderson, 2003. "Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 269-310, April.
    7. Lena Edlund, 2000. "The Marriage Squeeze Interpretation of Dowry Inflation: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1327-1333, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2014. "Arranged marriage, education and dowry: A Contract-theoretic perspective," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2014-006, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    2. M. Shahe Emran & Fenohasina Maret-Rakotondrazaka & Stephen C. Smith, 2014. "Education and Freedom of Choice: Evidence from Arranged Marriages in Vietnam," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(4), pages 481-501, April.
    3. Farre, Lidia, 2013. "The role of men in the economic and social development of women : implications for gender equality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6323, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arranged marriage; Dowry; Bride price; Female literacy; Marriage markets; Stable marriage allocation.;

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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