Informational Hold-Up, Disclosure Policy, and Career Concerns on the Example of Open Source Software Development
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References listed on IDEAS
- Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Career Concerns, Matching, And Optimal Disclosure Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1211-1250, November.
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- Dongryul Lee & Byung Kim, 2013. "Motivations for Open Source Project Participation and Decisions of Software Developers," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(1), pages 31-57, January.
- Atal Vidya & Shankar Kameshwari, 2015. "Developers’ Incentives and Open-Source Software Licensing: GPL vs BSD," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 1381-1416, July.
More about this item
KeywordsOpen source software; signaling;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2008-10-28 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2008-10-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IPR-2008-10-28 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAB-2008-10-28 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-NET-2008-10-28 (Network Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2008-10-28 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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