Strategic Product Pre-announcements in Markets with Network Effects
It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers’ purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products’ installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms are allowed to strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare and anti-trust policy.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, March.
- Heiko A. Gerlach, 2004. "Announcement, Entry, and Preemption When Consumers Have Switching Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 184-202, Spring.
- Sobel, Joel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 557-73, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nicholas Economides)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.