Why Do School District Budget Referenda Fail?
Our paper analyzes historical data for New York State on the percentagee of school budget proposals that are defeated each year and panel data that we have collected on budget vote success for indvidual school districts in the state. We find that changes in state aid matter, but not as much as one might expect. Defeating a budget proposal in one year neither increases nor decreases the likelihood that voters will defeat a proposal the next year. Districts whose school board members have longer terms have lower probabilities of having their budget proposals defeated. Finally, measures of school district educational and financial performance do not appear to influence budget vote outcomes.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Ehrenberg, Ronald G., RAndy A. Ehrenberg, Christopher L. Smith, and Liang Zhang. "Why Do School District Budget Referenda Fail?" Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 26, 2 (2004): 111-125.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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